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As
the metropolitan
and country road
networks around the
World age more
funds need to be
directed towards
infrastructure
maintenance which
will tighten
funding for new
capacity.
Concurrently the
alternative of
constructing more
additional new road
capacity is also
becoming
politically
unacceptable,
environmental
undesirable and
financially
infeasible. All
this makes it more
difficult to
provide the
necessary capacity
to absorb
spiralling mobility
demand. Economists
traditionally argue
that demand will
continue to
outstrip supply as
long as the users
daily decisions do
not take into
account the full
cost of their
consumption of
limited road space.
The
many road pricing
schemes currently
under trial in
Europe and being
implemented in Asia
work on charging
the user cold hard
cash for every
trip. There is an
equity objection
that road pricing
is a way of
"the rich
paying to get the
poor off the
roads". Making
the user pay for
something that they
regarded as
effectively free to
date, looks like
more taxes by
another name, and
in Australia and
North America
utterly politically
unacceptable.
Besides the
economic
perspective, rising
congestion with its
contribution to air
pollution, is also
a major
environmental
concern. Greenhouse
reduction targets
will only be
achievable with the
most efficient use
of internal
combustion engines.
Traffic jams and
stop-start crawls
through peak hours
are a luxury the
cities in
particular and the
World at large can
no-longer afford.
The
initial problem
then is, how to
give the road user
price signals
(related to the
true and full cost
of growing travel
demand) that will
encourage a
reduction of
stress, to the
network capacity
and the
environment,
without the
arbitrary
imposition of
inequitable new
taxes. The greater
problem is how to
mobilise public
opinion in favour
of any resulting
scheme.
Historically the
most effective
method to win
public approval is
to an arrangement
where they perceive
a net benefit to
themselves. We are
not talking here
about some vague
economist's notion
of net public
welfare to a social
class, but rather
direct benefit to
individual voters.
Currently road user
pay registration
and petrol taxes
for access to a
network that they
then perceive as
free there-after.
If the network's
ideal (efficient
free-flow) capacity
is nominally
capitalized and
distributed equally
to all registered
motorist, then they
have a more
tangible stake in
the efficiency of
the networks usage
and upkeep. This
nominally equity /
rations of
"RoAd
utilZatiOn
Options" or
"Razoos"
(Australian , New
Zealand slang for a
negligible amount
of money) could
also be made a
trade-able
commodity in a
market, in much the
same manner as
pollution credits
are now traded in
the USA.
So
then rather than
Road Pricing being
a tax on access, it
would be
transformed into a
mechanism to ration
congestion instead.
The Razoo market
then allows
congestion
traveler, to buy
extra rations for
the joys of
participating in
larger share of
traveler than their
fellow more prudent
traveler. Allowing
demand in the
network, thence
market place
mechanisms to set
the price of the
traded Razoos. The
prudent traveler
would be free to
spend their spare
Razoo allocation on
other approved
activities that
would aid the
lowering of
congestion;- public
transport fares,
smaller more
environmentally
friendly cars,
higher density
housing etc. The
approved seller
would then realize
the nominal cash
value (and a
possible premium)
of the Razoos in
the market place by
selling them on to
motorists that
desire more Razoos.
The government and
scheme operators
would also be
players in this
market, raising
required funds from
the difference
between the total
Razoo market supply
and the rolling
annual free
allocation of
Razoos to the
users.
Environmental
objectives could
then be encouraged
by adjusting the
size of the total
Razoo market over
time, in line with
environmental
developments. Any
excess demand for
Razoos will drive
the market price
up, thus encourage
transport
efficiency,
environmental
responsibility to
the degree that the
market is unwilling
to pay for flouting
such aims.
Politically this
arrangement is
highly effective,
as the government
is not seen to be
imposing taxes, but
rather reaping a
windfall in the
market place at the
expense of the
morally
indefensible
position of
congestion junkies
and polluters.
The
road user would
receive their
annual (or 6-18
monthly )
Razoo allocation
directly into their
personal account,
on their
allocation-date, or
when they renew
their license, or
first vehicle rego
in year
(depending upon
operational
conditions and
policy analysis
decisions in the
priced area).
The allocation is
periodical as the
Razoos conceptually
are
a perishable
item, what one does
not use within the
fixed time
allotment, vanishes
with the next
allocation. The
Department of Roads
and or
Transport may
choose to offer
refunds on
registration or
license (to their
full value,
effectively making
rego etc. free to
low impact users)
for
unused Razoos
at some fixed
nominal rate (as
expired Razoos
would be
worthless in
the market place).
Users would also be
issued with a
smart-card
onto which
they could
down-load enough
Razoos for their
immediate
needs, like
filling a car with
petrol. Depending
on policy the
smart-card
could be their
photo-license, or
vehicle-permit.
Down-loads should
be
effortlessly secured
from Automatic
financial instition
and phone-company
Teller
Machines (ATM)
or via Petrol
smart-card from
petrol stations
etc.. Private
purchases being
effected by the
operator
transferring extra
Razoos into your
personal account
on receipt of
payment. Each
vehicle in the
target area
fleet is
equipped free by
the scheme
operators with an
"In Vehicle
Unit" (IVU),
the scheme
operators funding
the equipment
roll-out from
the Razoo
market allocation
gap. The driver or
a passenger
(encouraging ride
sharing and car
pooling) put their
smart-card charged
up with
Razoos into
the IVU which
debits the
smart-card as the
vehicle is driven
around the
network.
The
envisaged system
uses beacons /
transmitter to
broadcast on
a common
bandwidth / channel
a signal as;
infra-red, or
packet-switched phone,
or low-frequency
radio over the
whole road-way (all
directions of
travel) at discrete
locations.Each time
the vehicle
comes to a
specially equipped
intersection or
other beacon
location it
receives the
local update about
beacon
identification and
the cost that
will be
incurred in the
travelling to the
surrounding
beacons. When the
vehicle arrives
at the next beacon
along its route the
smart-card is
automatically debited
at rate broad cast
from the previous
beacon to travel to
this beacon.
This operation
means that only the
smart-card in your
vehicle's IVU
knows where it is,
and where it has
been. This scenario
avoids
the major
privacy invasion of
American tag /
transponder
Electronic
Tolling Systems
where the operator
for billing and
audit purposes has
to
keeps records
by time and place
of every-ones
movements through
the network.
Because
the transactions in
these beacon
schemes Razoos
system are one
way from the beacon
to the vehicle via
the selected
communication technology,
the paraphernalia
of numerous
gantries required
by
most overseas
Electronic Road
Pricing systems is
also substantially
avoided. The
lack of gantries
besides being a
significant
implementation
saving, also
reduces fears of
"Big Brother
is Watching
You".
Enforcement could
be accomplished
culturally
sensitively, by a
road side
random Razoo
check activities
similar to Police
Services random
breath
test operations.
Or remotely with
standard Electronic
Tolling
Enforcement strategies
(number-plate
capture cameras and
closed beam
readers).
Enforcement activities
being funded by the
operators from the
Razoo market
allocation gap.
Shadow tolling
(directly charging
a central authority
for
counted vehicle)
of bridge and
tunnel crossing or
tollways and
private
motorways could
likewise be funded
from the Razoo
market allocation
gap.
(Razoos left
to sold in the
market after annual
user allocation)
Occasional
visitors from
out-of-area, (if
from a policy
perspective it
is considered
necessary or
desirable) would be
able to purchase
day passes /
transponders at the
limits of the
road-priced
network.
Regular visitors
from neighbouring
regions like,
commercial
transporters,
could either
be exempted, or
register for a
reduced allocation,
or
directly charged
(in which case they
may find it more
cost effective to
purchase an
IVU and a small
supply of Razoos).
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